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Abstract
According to cognitive appraisal theory, emotion in an indi-
vidual is the result of how a situation/event is evaluated by the
individual. This evaluation has different outcomes among peo-
ple and it is often suggested to be operationalised by a set of
rules or beliefs acquired by the subject throughout develop-
ment. Unfortunately, this view is particularly detrimental for
computational applications of emotion appraisal. In fact, it re-
quires providing a knowledge base that is particularly difficult
to establish and manage, especially in systems designed for
highly complex scenarios, such as social robots. In addition,
according to appraisal theory, an individual might elicit more
than one emotion at a time in reaction to an event. Hence, de-
termining which emotional state should be attributed in rela-
tionship to a specific event is another critical issue not yet fully
addressed by the available literature. In this work, we show
that: (i) the cognitive appraisal process can be realised without
a complex set of rules; instead, we propose that this process
can be operationalised by knowing only the positive or nega-
tive perceived effect the event has on the subject, thus facili-
tating extensibility and integrability of the emotional system;
(ii) the final emotional state to attribute in relation to a specific
situation is better explained by ethical reasoning mechanisms.
These hypotheses are supported by our experimental results.
Therefore, this contribution is particularly significant to pro-
vide a more simple and generalisable explanation of cognitive
appraisal theory and to promote the integration between theo-
ries of emotion and ethics studies, currently often neglected by
the available literature.
Keywords: Cognitive appraisal theory; computational emo-
tion model; emotion combination; ethics
Introduction
The attribution of an emotional state to self or others can oc-
cur when a complex state of the organism is accompanied by
variable degrees of awareness, often referred to as appraisal
(Scherer, 2001). Two levels of appraisal can be distinguished
(Lambie & Marcel, 2002): a first-order phenomenological
state and a conscious second-order awareness. Both states
can be either self-directed (first-person perspective) or world-
directed (third person perspective) (Vitale, Williams, John-
ston, & Boccignone, 2014). The present work will be con-
cerned in discussing the nature of the conscious second-order
appraisal process, known as cognitive appraisal process of
emotion.
Traditional literature in emotional processing studies sug-
gests that this cognitive appraisal process may underlie the
evaluation of a set of variables called appraisal variables
(Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman,
Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 2001). Appraisal variables
can be understood as the criteria used to assess a situation
in relation to emotion elicitation process. For example, in
appraisal theory of Ortony et al. (1990), core appraisal vari-
ables1 considered are desirability - which assesses how de-
sirable an event is, praiseworthiness - which measures how
praiseworthy the action of an agent is and appealingness -
which measures how appealing is the agent to the appraising
individual. Appraisal theories suggest that individuals con-
verge to an emotional state depending on the evaluation of
these variables. This position is further supported by the ma-
jority of existing computational explanations of cognitive ap-
praisal (Dias & Paiva, 2005; El-Nasr, Yen, & Ioerger, 2000;
Velasquez, 1997). However, the proposed accounts offer lim-
ited perspectives addressing only domain specific situations
and making use of knowledge shaped as a set of pre-defined
rules (Dias & Paiva, 2005; El-Nasr et al., 2000). Thus, (i)
the available literature in cognitive appraisal theory cur-
rently does not provide a clear computational explanation for
domain-independent cognitive appraisal mechanisms. This is
a significant research problem for both cognitive science and
computer science research communities; in fact, on one hand,
having a computational theory of domain-independent cog-
nitive appraisal mechanisms can assist cognitive science re-
searchers in addressing open research gaps in emotional pro-
cessing studies, and, on the other hand, this computational
account can be more easily integrated in disparate intelli-
gent systems without the need of defining a complex set of
domain-dependent rules.
However, this is not the only limitation presented by cur-
rently available explanations of cognitive appraisal theory.
According to cognitive appraisal theory of emotion, an event
can elicit more than one emotions simultaneously with vary-
ing intensities (Ortony et al., 1990). Nevertheless, (ii) it is
not clear yet what is the best strategy to select an emotional
state for attribution following this appraisal process. This
is again a significant research problem. In particular, having
a mechanism able to determine the final optimal emotional
state is a highly desirable feature for intelligent systems inter-
acting with humans, such as social robots (Williams, 2012),
since this is a necessary skill for being proficient in emotional
intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1993). For example, it has
been widely documented that the appraised emotional state
of an individual has direct impact on decision making and ac-
tion selection (Isen & Means, 1983; Loewenstein & Lerner,
1Note that there are other appraisal variables proposed by the
theory. Describing all the appraisal variables and their meanings is
out of the scope of this paper.
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2003). Thus, without an appropriate mechanism able to deter-
mine the final optimal emotional state, the intelligent system
cannot take socially acceptable and ethical actions (Vitale,
Williams, & Johnston, 2014).
This paper aims to present a computational model of emo-
tion processing that adds a higher layer of cognition to ap-
praisal mechanism. The significance of this paper is further
increased by this novel approach going beyond the domain of
emotion theories and embracing the strengths of ethical the-
ories. Although, the literature includes previous studies sug-
gesting interactions between theories of emotions and ethics
(Callahan, 1988; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001), to our knowl-
edge, there are no computational explanations addressing the
interactions between ethics and emotion processing mecha-
nisms (Ojha & Williams, 2016). Therefore, in this paper we
aim to:
(i) Provide a computational model of cognitive appraisal of
emotion able to elicit appropriate emotional states with-
out the need of defining pre-determined rules, but rather by
using a general domain-independent approach facilitating
easy extensibility of the emotionally intelligent systems;
(ii) Provide a novel computational process inspired by ethi-
cal theories for the selection of the optimal emotional state
among the elicited ones.
The offered outcomes will provide valuable insights to
gather a better understanding on how integrating ethical theo-
ries in emotion processing mechanisms can improve existing
computational models of emotions. This in turn will advance
the understanding of the role of cognition in emotion.
Computational Models of Cognitive Appraisal
Theories from cognitive science and psychology have been
implemented in various computational models of cognition.
In this section, we will present some of the computational
models of emotions implementing cognitive appraisal theory
of emotion that are related to our discussion and identify their
current limitations.
The models available in literature use evaluation criteria
called appraisal variables (Ortony et al., 1990; Lazarus, 1991;
Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer, 2001) to assess or evaluate
the events for the generation of emotion. The choice of ap-
praisal variables depends on the appraisal theory used and
also on the application of the model. One common limita-
tion of the existing accounts is their heavy specificity to the
considered application domain and the determination of the
elicited emotional states by means of pre-defined rules (Dias
& Paiva, 2005; El-Nasr et al., 2000). This approach likely
leads to low extensibility of the system.
One available account is Fuzzy Logic Adaptive Model
of Emotions (FLAME), a fuzzy logic based computational
model of emotion (El-Nasr et al., 2000) inspired by appraisal
theories suggested by Ortony et al. (1990) and Roseman et
al. (1990). The main strategy used by FLAME is the evalua-
tion of if-then rules in order to assess the considered appraisal
variables. As we already discussed, this approach leads to a
particularly poor extensibility of the system, since adding a
new rule would require to consequently revise and adapt the
entire knowledge base.
EMotion and Adaptation (EMA) (Gratch & Marsella,
2004; S. C. Marsella & Gratch, 2009) borrows the ideas from
the cognitive motivational appraisal theory of Lazarus (1991).
It stands out from other existing computational models of
emotion in that it is able to compute emotions irrespective
of the experiment domain. However, this model is not able
to achieve this only by using the perceived positivity or neg-
ativity of an event like our model, which will be discussed
later.
Another related account is Fearnot AffecTIve Mind Archi-
tecture (FAtiMA), a computational model of emotion pro-
posed by Dias and Paiva (2005). It is significantly inspired
by appraisal theory of Ortony et al. (1990). FAtiMA con-
siderably uses domain specific scenarios built on top of pre-
defined appraisal rules in order to appraise the desired situ-
ation without clearly suggesting how to easily generalise the
proposed appraisal mechanisms for different domains.
Beside not providing a valid and easy strategy to integrate
the suggested computational model in disparate application
domains, the available accounts do not offer an effective way
to determine the final emotional state in response to an event
in a specific situation. This is still an open research prob-
lem since most appraisal theories do not explain how this can
be achieved (see, for example, Ortony et al. (1990); Scherer
(2001)). Some strategies propose to select the emotional state
exhibiting (i) highest intensity (Gratch & Marsella, 2004) or
driven by the higher motivational state (i.e. hunger, thirst,
pain, and fatigue) (El-Nasr et al., 2000), whereas other strate-
gies propose to (ii) blend the elicited intensities of multiple
emotions in order to determine the final emotional state (see
Reilly (2006) for more details on the strategy used). In the
Evaluation section, we shall discuss why these approaches
might not be desirable methods to reach to a final emotional
state.
As previously discussed, an emotion processing model de-
veloped by using a rule-based approach is unlikely to offer
easy extensibility and high integrability in disparate emotion-
ally intelligent systems among different application domains.
Thus, in this paper we provide computational mechanisms
general enough to be used in different domains without the
need of re-implementing or adapting the proposed model, but
at the same time able to appraise the appropriate emotional
states for the considered situation. In addition, we suggest
to use ethical theories to determine the final emotional state
among the ones elicited by the cognitive appraisal process.
Determining this state is particularly important to drive so-
cially acceptable behaviours.
Hypotheses
Consider a social interaction between two subjects. In this
work we will call sender the subject producing a behavioural
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response directed to the other subject, which we will call re-
ceiver. Denote with S (B,C)receiver a value determining how neg-
ative or positive the behaviour B of the sender is perceived
by the receiver in a given context C. S (B,C)receiver is a plausi-
ble computational representation summarising within a single
valanced value the somatovisceral reactions of the body to the
given situation (B,C) following the first-order phenomeno-
logical stage of emotional processing (Bechara, Damasio, &
Damasio, 2000). As previously mentioned in the introduction
of this paper, this work is not concerned with discussing the
implementation of first-order phenomenological processes.
Denote with C (S (B,C)receiver) a cognitive appraisal process able
to appraise the intensities I = {ie1 , . . . , ien} of a set of n con-
sidered emotional states {e1, . . . ,en} given the first-order phe-
nomenological reaction of the receiver S (B,C)receiver. Thus, our
first hypothesis is that:
Hypothesis 1 The value S (B,C)receiver is a sufficient information to
perform a cognitive appraisal process C able to elicit the in-
tensities of the considered emotional states and consequently
promoting the selection of a final emotional state resembling
human cognitive appraisal.
Importantly, the value S (B,C)receiver is completely independent
from other pre-existing values S already available by the sys-
tem and concerning different behaviours and contexts. In
other words, adding a new value S to our model, thus extend-
ing the knowledge of the system, will not require to adapt the
pre-existing knowledge and it will not necessitate to modify
the parameters of the computational model.
Denote with E(I,θethics) and with E(I) two processes able
to provide a final emotional state given the set of the elicited
emotion intensities I realised by the cognitive appraisal pro-
cess C . E(I,θethics) includes parameters operationalising
ethical theories, whereas E(I) uses a generic strategy with-
out considering the ethical dimension of the given situation.
Therefore, our second hypothesis is that:
Hypothesis 2 The cognitive appraisal process augmented by
ethical reasoning mechanisms E(I,θethics) converge to more
accurate emotional states compared to cognitive appraisal
processes augmented by generic reasoning mechanisms E(I).
In the remainder of this paper we will offer the functional
level description of our computational account and experi-
mental results validating our hypotheses.
Model Implementation
Cognitive Appraisal Process. The process of emotion gen-
eration in our computational model2 is shown in Figure 1. As
mentioned earlier, when an event occurs, its appraisal (evalu-
ation) is done by using a set of variables called appraisal vari-
ables. Ortony et al. (1990) state that these appraisal variables
are computed based on the goals, standards and attitudes of
2Our computational model is inspired by the work of S. Marsella,
Gratch, and Petta (2010) but implemented with completely different
computation mechanism.
the individual. In the context of our computational model of
emotion, if we denote these goals, standards and attitudes as
an internal parameter θint and the perceived knowledge of the
environment that the system receives when an event occurs as
Kenv, then a function for computing appraisal variable can be
represented as:
vi = Vi(Kenv,θint) (1)
Which means that the quantitative value of an appraisal
variable is the function of the event knowledge gathered from
the environment (Kenv) and the internal goals, standards and
attitudes (θint ). This computation is done by an Appraisal
Mechanism component, as shown in Figure 1. Each com-
puted appraisal variable contributes in the generation of one
or more emotions (Ortony et al., 1990) and helps in estimat-
ing the intensities of the considered emotions3.
The majority of available computational models of emo-
tion compute vi by using domain-specific rule-based func-
tions (Dias & Paiva, 2005; El-Nasr et al., 2000; Velasquez,
1997). Because of this, when the application domain or input
parameters (Kenv) change in those models, the internal rep-
resentation of goals, standards and attitudes (θint ) also needs
to be changed. In our model, Kenv is modelled as a set of
valanced scores S providing an interpretation of the nega-
tive or positive connotation of the experienced events. Im-
portantly, the scores S are completely independent from θint .
Thus, extending our model with new knowledge or adapt-
ing previous one will not necessitate to modify the model’s
parameters θint . In this paper we will not provide imple-
mentation details and we consequently limit our contribution
to this functional description, since this is sufficient for the
validation of the proposed hypotheses. The detailed mech-
anism of computation of appraisal variables in our computa-
tional model can be found in another paper (Ojha & Williams,
2017).
Figure 1: General Appraisal Mechanism.
Emotional State Selection. Next crucial step is determin-
ing the final emotional state of the system. Our proposition is
that when more than one active emotions are generated, then a
final emotional state is best determined by a higher cognitive
layer of ethical reasoning.
Figure 2 shows more details of the Emotion Combination
Mechanism included in Figure 1 and suggests the mechanism
to determine the final emotional state for attribution. The
emotions e1, e2, e3,.....and en with respective intensities ie1 ,
3Currently, our model can generate and express eight different
emotions described by (Ortony et al., 1990) namely Joy, Distress,
Appreciation, Reproach, Gratitude, Anger, Liking and Disliking.
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Figure 2: Ethical Emotion Combination Mechanism.
ie2 , ie3 ,.....and ien output from the Affect Generation compo-
nent are processed by applying the concepts of deontological
and consequentialist ethics (Hooker, 1996) in order to deter-
mine the final emotional state. Deontological ethics says that
one should satisfy owns duties before making a choice of ac-
tion/decision and consequentialist ethics says that one should
consider the consequences to all the relevant parties before
making a decision (Hooker, 1996). Functionally, our ethical
emotion combination mechanism is shown in 2.
eethical = E(I,θethics) (2)
Where, eethical ∈ {e1,e2,e3, ...,en} is the final emotional
state. I is the set of emotion intensities and θethics represents
ethical standards.
ehigh = Ehigh(I) (3)
eblended = Eblended(I) (4)
Equations 3 and 4 represent the functions computing re-
spectively the final emotional states for highest intensity ap-
proach and blended intensity approach, which were intro-
duced earlier. Clearly, these functions only take the inten-
sities of various emotions for the determination of the final
emotional state. However, our model reaches to a final emo-
tional state with the help of higher cognitive mechanism of
ethical reasoning (as shown in 2).
The emotional responses of our computational model
based on: (1) Highest Intensity Approach, (2) Intensity
Blending Approach and (3) Ethical Reasoning Approach will
be compared with emotion data obtained from human partic-
ipants in the Evaluation section.
Evaluation
In order to operationalise our model and to consequently val-
idate our hypotheses, we designed two sets of web-based sur-
veys requiring two tasks: an action scoring task and a mind-
reading task. In both the experimental conditions we pro-
vided a set of stories concerning social exchanges between
two individuals, a sender and a receiver, as previously de-
noted.
Participants covering a broad set of countries were invited
on Facebook or through mailing lists to take our surveys. The
surveys were completely anonymous. We received a total of
153 responses (male=82, female=71). Importantly, the sub-
jects were randomly attributed to either the action scoring
task or the mind-reading task.
Scenario Design
In order to avoid ad-hoc scenarios facilitating our model, we
did not design the scenarios ourselves. Rather, we requested
4 naı̈ve adults, without any knowledge about the objectives of
the present research, to cooperate in designing six scenarios
under the following conditions:
• The scenario shall include the interactions of two subjects,
one of them denoted as sender and the other as receiver;
• A minimum of 5 and a maximum of 10 actions of the
sender directed to the receiver describing a plausible social
interaction between two persons shall be provided;
• At the beginning, each scenario shall provide the contex-
tual information about the designed situation and the two
considered subjects. Moreover, additional contextual in-
formation could be provided during the development of the
described social exchanges, whenever this information is
necessary to contextualise the remaining interactions;
• No contextual information suggesting the potential emo-
tional state of the receiver shall be provided for individual
interactions, with the exception of the contextual informa-
tion provided at the beginning of the scenario.
The result of this process was a set of scenarios used during
both the action scoring and the mind-reading tasks mentioned
earlier. The scenarios included interactions between (1) two
strangers (a male and a female) interacting on a bench of a
park, (2) two close friends (both males) meeting at a beach,
(3) a husband and a wife having an argument about forget-
ting the birthday, (4) an elderly woman affected by dementia
and her nurse (both females) experiencing a distressful mo-
ment, (5) a guy having argument with his brother, and (6) an
interaction between a customer of a café and a waiter (both
males). In total, the scenarios included 48 social exchanges
of the senders directed to the receivers.
Action Scoring Task
The experimental subjects participating in the action scoring
task were asked to guess, for each scenario, how positive or
negative each social exchange performed by the sender would
be perceived by the receiver in that specific context. The
rating was based on 7-point Likert scale: Extremely Neg-
ative, Very Negative, Negative, Neither Negative Nor Pos-
itive, Positive, Very Positive, Extremely Positive. We nu-
merically evaluated the responses by attributing a weight to
each point of the scale (i.e. -1, -0.66, -0.33, 0, 0.33, 0.66
and 1 respectively). We averaged the responses obtaining a
value S for each of the considered social exchanges B in the
specific context C. In this way we were able to provide the
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Results of the experiments. (a) The cumulative rank-distances of the models’ predictions from human assessment.
(b) The rank-distances of the models’ predictions from human assessment.
necessary input knowledge to our system (i.e. a set of nu-
meric scores S ∈ [−1,+1]) and to consequently perform cog-
nitive appraisal processes estimating the emotional state of
the receivers in each considered scenario. Recall that this pro-
cess did not require any changes to our computational model,
which provides a valid domain-independent approach of cog-
nitive appraisal process.
Mind-Reading Task
In order to compare the emotional response of our compu-
tational model, we asked to the subjects participating in the
mind-reading task to guess, for each interaction of the sender,
what would have been the chances that the receiver would
happen to be in a particular emotional state, based on the
just happened interaction and the previously occurred social
exchanges and contextual information. Therefore, for each
of the eight considered emotional states the rating was based
on 6-point Likert scale: Not at all, Very Low, Low, Medium,
High and Very High. The additional rating “Not at all” was
necessary to allow the participants to express no chances to
attribute such emotional state to the receiver. We numerically
evaluated the responses by attributing a weight to each point
of the scale (i.e. 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0 respectively).
Average score given by the participants to various emotions
was calculated by performing the weighted average of the rat-
ings.
Results
Based on the results of the mind-reading task, the emotions
for each interaction of each scenario were ranked from 1 to 8,
with the emotion having the highest average score ranked as
1 and the one with lowest score ranked as 8.
We considered three strategies to computationally predict
the final emotional state of each interaction: choosing the
emotional state with highest intensity, blending the emotional
intensities to determine the final emotional state as described
by Reilly (2006), and our suggested approach based on eth-
ical reasoning. Each of these three strategies followed a
common domain-independent cognitive appraisal process, as
discussed in the model implementation section. We com-
pared these computational predictions against the gathered
human assessments (i.e. emotions ranked 1) by computing
their rank-distances, suggesting how close the computational
model was compared to human assessment. The results are
summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the gathered results.
Mean Median Std
High intensity 2.4167 2 2.3232
Blended emotion 2.3125 2 2.0228
Ethical reasoning 2.0833 1 2.3140
In order to demonstrate that the proposed common stage
of domain-independent cognitive appraisal was able to elicit
emotional intensities similarly to human cognitive appraisal
process (Hypothesis 1), we analysed the human responses of
the mind-reading task. We noticed that for most of the consid-
ered interactions some of the emotions resulted in very close
averaged scores. Therefore, given ε = 0.1, for each interac-
tion we counted the number of emotions having an average
score of greater than or equal to the score of highest scored
emotion minus ε for that interaction. ε was chosen to be equal
to half of the score attributed to each point of the Likert scale
(i.e. 0.2), thus being able to group emotions plausibly ranked
with similar likelihood by most of the human assessors. The
average number of similarly rated emotional states among all
the 48 interactions was 3.2, thus suggesting that on average
human cognitive appraisal promoted 3 comparable emotional
states to attribute to the receiver. From Figure 3a it is clear to
see that for distances less than 2 ranks to the human assess-
ment (i.e. predictions among the first 3 higher scored emo-
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tions) our cognitive appraisal model was able to promote the
selection (using all the three considered strategies) of approx-
imately 70% of the emotional states plausibly attributed by
humans participants to the receivers described in the mind-
reading task scenarios.
In addition, we can also observe that the cognitive pro-
cess augmented by the proposed ethical reasoning mechanism
converges to more accurate emotional states compared to the
other investigated strategies (Hypothesis 2). Figure 3b fur-
ther suggests that the proposed ethical reasoning mechanism
reduces average rank-distances from human appraisal. There-
fore, the present results support both the proposed hypothe-
ses.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented our computational model of emo-
tion based on appraisal theory that is able to generate emo-
tions using the expected degree of positivity or negativity as-
sociated with an action/event. This allowed our model to be
completely independent of the application domain and effi-
ciently appraise a situation for the elicitation of various emo-
tions. In addition, our model adds a higher layer of cog-
nition in the emotion mechanism by integrating an ethical
reasoning capability for the determination of the final emo-
tional state when more than one emotions are generated by
the model. Experimental results support our first hypoth-
esis proposing that cognitive appraisal is possible without
prior domain knowledge and second hypothesis suggesting
that ethical reasoning is a better strategy to explain human
emotional state attribution process.
Yet, our computational model still has some room for im-
provement. For example, it is important to consider that peo-
ple with different personality generate emotions in different
ways. Thus, in the future, we aim to use the concept of per-
sonality and examine how the difference in personality makes
difference in ethical standards and hence in emotion genera-
tion.
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